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Resources for the Future
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This paper examines "traditional" (non-environmental) efficiency conse-
quences and environmental effects of two energy tax policies: a tax on
fossil and synthetic fuels based on Btu (or energy) content and a tax on
consumer purchases of gasoline. It uses a model that uniquely combines
attention to details of the U.S. tax system with a consolidated treatment
of U.S. energy use and pollution emissions.
On traditional efficiency grounds, each of the energy taxes emerges as
more costly to the economy than increases in personal or corporate
income taxes of equal revenue yield. The time profiles of GNP and
consumption are significantly lower under the energy taxes than under
the alternatives.
This paper was prepared for the NBER Conference, Tax Policy and the Economy, in
Washington, DC on November 16, 1993. I am grateful to Lans Bovenberg and Jim Poterba
for very helpful suggestions, to Jim Lockhart and Anne Forrest of the Environmental Law
Institute for considerable help in obtaining and organizing pollution-emissions data, and
to Jesse David, Patrick Siegman, and Steven Weinberg for excellent research assistance.
Financial support from the National Science Foundation (Grant SBR-9310362) is gratefully
acknowledged.106Goulder
We perform a number of simulation experiments designed to isolate
key structural features of energy taxes and identify which features ac-
count for their "excess costs"the nonenvironmental welfare costs over
and above those of an equal-revenue increase in the personal income
tax. For both energy taxes, the relative narrowness of the tax base
accounts for most of the excess cost. Differences in costs also are attribut-
able to differences in the stage of activity or type of commodity repre-
sented in the tax base. The Btu tax's application to gross output (as
compared with net output under an income tax) serves to expand the
excess costs. In contrast, the gasoline tax's focus on consumption(as
opposed to income) tends to mitigate the excess costs. The finding that
energy taxes generate larger gross costs than the income taxalternatives
is robust to a range of specifications for values of key parameters.
On the environmental side, we quantify the differences in the im-
pacts of these tax alternatives for pollution emissions. For each of the
eight major air pollutants considered, energy taxes induce emissions
reductions that are at least nine times larger than the reductions under
the income-tax alternatives. The differences in emissions impacts reflect
the close connections between energy use and pollution generation.
For the Btu tax, the largest percentage reductions in emissions are for
CO2 and NOX compounds. For the gasoline tax, the emissions reduc-
tions are spread somewhat more evenly across the eight major pollut-
ants considered.
Overall, this study indicates that the Btu and gasoline taxes considered
are inferior to the alternatives on narrow efficiency groundsbut superior
on environmental grounds. It remains an open questionwhether the
environmental attractions of these taxes are large enough to offset their
relatively high nonenvironmental costs.
1. INTRODUCTION
There is renewed interest in energy taxes as sources of public revenue.
In February of this year the Clinton Administration proposed a Btu tax as
a key component of its deficit-reduction package.Although this particu-
lar component was eventually removed from the budget package, the
legislation passed by Congress several months later introduced in its
place another (albeit smaller) energy taxa tax on gasoline and other
transportation fuels. Other energy taxes (such as carbon taxes) continue
to be examined closely by policy makers.
There are many reasons for the intensified focus on energy taxes.
Some are purely political. To many policy makers, certain types of
energy taxes seem more acceptable to the voting public thantypical taxEnergy Taxes107
increases, such as increments to personal or corporate income tax rates.
Environmental considerations also are relevant here. Many have ar-
gued that the use of energy contributes disproportionately (in compari-
son with other activities) to major forms of pollution, and that taxing
energy is a sensible way to discourage environmentally damaging activi-
ties. Efficiency concerns also apply. Some consider energy taxes to be
relatively efficient instruments for obtaining government revenue in
comparison with other plausible taxes.1
Despite the extensive debate on the attractions and drawbacks of en-
ergy taxes, there has been relatively little quantitative analysis of the
gross efficiency costs2 (the efficiency costs before netting out environ-
mental benefits) and the environmental effects of these taxes in compari-
son with plausible alternatives such as increases in income taxes.3 This
paper provides a quantitative assessment.
We concentrate on two main types of energy taxes: a general tax on
energy (a Btu tax) and a tax on consumer purchases of gasoline. For
these taxes, we ask the following two sets of questions:
What are the (gross) efficiency costs of these energy taxes, and how
do they compare with the efficiency costs of more traditional sources
of revenue such as increases in income taxes? How can the different
efficiency costs among energy taxes and between these and other
taxes be explained?
How do these energy taxes differ from each other and from equal-
revenue income taxes in terms of the impacts on emissions of impor-
tant air pollutants? What are the sources of these differences?
On the other hand, some analysts contend that energy taxes have larger efficiency costs
than ordinary income taxes, and some would go so far as to maintain that any possible
advantages of energy taxes in the environmental domain would be more than offset by the
disadvantages in traditional cost dimensions.
2It is important to make clear what is meant by efficiency costs here. Among economists, the
notion of efficiency customarily refers to the aggregate net benefit or cost to the economy
from a policy change, as measured by adding up the dollar value of welfare impacts to each
person. In its broadest sense, efficiency should encompass both environment-related as well
as other welfare effects stemming from a given policy change. For convenience, in this
paper we separate the environmental considerations from other efficiency considerations.
Unless indicated otherwise, efficiency costs will mean the gross welfare costs, before netting
out the benefits stemming from environmental changes.
Studies by Goulder (1993) and Jorgenson and Wilcoxen (1993) have examined the overall
costs of policies in which a carbon tax is combined in revenue-neutral fashion with cuts in
income taxes. The overall costs of such policies implicitly indicate the relative costs of the
carbon tax and the changes to income taxes. This paper differs from the earlier studies by
concentrating on Btu and gasoline taxes, and examining more closely the mechanisms that
account for the differences in costs between energy taxes and the income tax alternatives.108Goulder
It should be noted that these questions focus on the aggregate economic
and environmental impacts. Here we do not consider important distribu-
tional issues, namely, how these policies differ in the distribution of
their impacts across household income groups, across geographical re-
gions, or across nations (impacts on international competitiveness).
To address these questions, we first offer some theoretical consider-
ations relevant to the choice between energy and income taxes. Wethen
investigate these issues numerically using a simulation model of energy-
economy-environment interactions in the United States. The numerical
model projects paths of economic variables and pollution emissions un-
der alternative tax regimes.
The simulation model adopts a dynamic, general equilibrium frame-
work, which is especially useful for examining energy-tax options for at
least two reasons. First, the general equilibrium structure addresses inter-
actions across various sectors and industries. In contrast withpartial
equilibrium models, which consider a particular sector or industry in
isolation, a general equilibrium model treats the different sectors and
industries as part of a single interactive system. Thus, one can examine,
for example, how the impacts of an energy tax are transmitted from
energy markets to other markets and how responses inother markets
feed back on energy markets. Second, a dynamic general equilibrium
framework pays close attention to effects on saving and investment and
other intertemporal adjustment issues. The taxes under consideration
here can be expected to influence rates of return in different industries,
thereby affecting incentives to invest and economic growth. A dynamic
general equilibrium model is geared to address these effects.
Beyond the basic attractions of the general equilibrium framework, the
particular model employed in this paper has features that make it espe-
cially well suited to the task at hand. First, the model uniquely combines
a detailed treatment of the U.S. tax systemwith a close attention to
sources and uses of energy in the United States. In contrastwith other
general equilibrium tax models, this model isolates important energy
industries, takes account of substitution possibilities among energy fu-
els, incorporates the nonrenewable nature of oil and gas resources, and
accounts for the transition from conventional fuels to "backstop" re-
sources. And in contrast with other energy models (generalequilibrium
or otherwise), this model contains a detailed treatmentof U.S. taxes.
Building on earlier tax policy work,4 it incorporates specific tax instru-
ments and addresses tax incentive effects along a number of important
See, for example, Goulder and Summers (1989), Goulder (1989), or Goulder and
Thalmann (1993).Energy Taxes109
dimensions, including firms' investment incentives, equity values, and
profits,5 and household consumption, saving, and labor-supply deci-
sions. The appeal of accounting for existing taxes is not simply that of
comprehensiveness. A well-known principle of public finance is that the
economic distortion or cost of a new tax depends fundamentally on what
taxes already exist in the system: taxes interact. It is simply impossible to
calculate the effects of new tax initiatives without accounting for pre-
existing taxes.
Another distinguishing feature of the model is its consideration of
environmental impacts.6 Previous applications of the model have concen-
trated on the economic costs of a number of energy or environmental tax
policies.7 Recently, this model was extended to capture the impacts of
tax policies on emissions of eight major air pollutants. This permits us to
examine numerically a key dimension of the debate about energy
taxesthe extent to which such taxes might yield environmental gains
relative to other tax options. It should be recognized that attention to
emissions represents only a first step along the environmental dimen-
sion. Ultimately, one would like to be able to assess the environment-
related, welfare impacts of various tax policies. This would require one to
capture all the links from (1) changes in emissions to (2) changes in
concentrations, (3) changes in environmental impacts (such as human
health), and (4) changes in welfare (evaluated in dollars). No economic
model has yet consolidated all of these links on the national level for
several major pollutants. The model applied in this paper takes a first
step in this direction by connecting tax policy initiatives to changes in
emissions for various pollutants.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses some
theoretical issues relevant to the choice between energy and income
taxes. Section 3 provides an overview of the simulation model employed
to assess these options numerically. The fourth section presents and
interprets results from simulations of energy and income tax policies,
and the final section offers conclusions.
Here the model applies the asset price approach to investment developed in Summers
(1981).
6Perhaps the closest cousin to the current model is the intertemporal, general equilibrium
model of Jorgenson and Wilcoxen (1990, 1993). However, the two models differ in some
significant ways. The JorgensonWilcoxen model stands out in having a stronger econo-
metric foundation and in capturing price-responsive technological change within indus-
tries. The present model, on the other hand, contains considerably more detail on U.S.
taxes, explicitly addresses the transition from exhaustible conventional fuels to backstop
technologies, and captures effects of policies on emissions of a range of air pollutants.
See, for example, Goulder (1992a, 1993).110Goulder
2. EFFICIENCY EFFECTS OF ENERGY AND
TRADITIONAL TAXES: THEORETICAL
CONSIDERATIONS
This section examines, from a theoretical vantage point, the attractions
and disadvantages of energy taxes in terms of their efficiency impacts. In
its broadest sense, the notion of efficiency encompasses all of the aggre-
gate welfare impacts of policy changes, including those that arise from
policy-induced environmental changes. However, it is convenient to
separate out the environmental and nonenvironmental impacts of poli-
cies. In this section we will start with nonenvironmental considerations
and then turn to environmental issues.
One important qualification deserves attention at the outset. Here we
are comparing pure tax policies. Real-world taxes usually are not pure.
The U.S. income tax, for example, is actually a mix of a pure income tax
and a pure consumption tax. Similarly, energy taxes often apply at
different rates to different forms of energy and may have very specific
exemptions and other special provisions. This section abstracts from
such complications.
2.1 Traditional (Nonenvironmental) Considerations
2.1.1 Distortions in Labor, Capital, Intermediate Input and Commodity
Markets To gauge the nonenvironmental efficiency impacts of energy
and income taxes, it is necessary to consider the different dimensions
along which these taxes generate economic distortions and excess bur-
dens. We identify four main margins in which the principal distortions
occur: the labor-leisure margin, the intertemporal margin, the margin of
intermediate good choice, and the margin of consumer good choice.
These margins are associated with labor, capital, intermediate good, and
consumer good markets. The labor market is the domain in which the
choice between working and enjoying leisure is made. The capital mar-
ket is the domain for intertemporal choice, that is, the choice of how
much to consume tomorrow (by saving and investing today) rather than
consume today. Input and consumer good markets determine the alloca-
tion of producers' expenditures on inputs and of households' expendi-
tures on consumer goods at given points in time.
Energy and income taxes have different effects along these margins,
and these differences help explain their relative efficiency impacts. As is
well known, the personal income taxin particular, the component that
applies to individual wage incomedistorts the labor-leisure margin by
driving a wedge between the marginal social value of labor (as indicatedEnergy Taxes111
TABLE 1.
Sites of Distortions Directly Generated by Energy and Income Taxes.
by the before-tax real wage) and the marginal private value of labor (as
expressed by the after-tax real wage).8 In addition, it distorts the in-
tertemporal margin (capital market) through the tax on the return to
capital: it drives a wedge between the marginal social value of a unit of
capital (the pre-tax return to capital) and the marginal private value (the
after-tax return). The corporate income tax likewise can introduce an
intertemporal distortion.9 Since the corporate tax does not apply to labor
income, it has no direct impact on the labor-leisure margin.
These notions are summarized in Table 1. The Xs in the table indicate
the markets where a given tax directly distorts resource allocation. For
the income taxes, there are no Xs in the input and consumer good
markets; these taxes do not directly affect input choice or the choice
across consumer goods.
For the energy taxes, in contrast, there are direct impacts on input
choice and consumer good choice. The Btu tax raises the cost of energy
inputs (fuels) relative to other inputs, and in so doing affects firms' input
choices. As shown by Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) and Stiglitz and
Dasgupta (1971), the distortion of input choice corresponds to a (gross)
efficiency loss. Similarly, a consumer-level gasoline tax alters the relative
prices of gasoline and other consumer goods. Under fairly plausible
assumptions, uniform taxation of consumer goods is optimal.1° When
these conditions apply, the gasoline tax distorts the choice among con-
8On this issue see, for example, Bradford (1984) and Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987).
Stiglitz (1976) points out that for certain combinations of interest deductibility and depre-
ciation allowances, the tax rate on the marginal investment will be zero, and the corporate
tax will function as a (nondistortionary) pure profits tax.
° Sufficient conditions are homotheticity of the utility function and weak separability
between leisure and overall consumption. See Auerbach (1985).
Consumer
Personal Corporate gasoline
income taxincome taxBtu tax
increase increase tax increase
Factor markets
Labor-leisure choice X X X
Intertemporal choice X X X
Product markets
Intermediate input choice X
Consumer good choice X112Goulder
sumer goods to the extent that it makes taxation of thesegoods less
uniform.
This point might lead one to suppose that energy and income taxes
introduce direct distortions in different marketsthat energy taxes dis-
tort product (intermediate input and consumer good) markets while
income taxes distort factor (labor and capital) markets. A closer look
indicates that this is not the case. Even though energy taxes are not
imposed directly on labor, they still distort labor-leisure choice: such
taxes are implicit taxes on labor. To the extent that a Btu tax raises the
costs of producing consumer goods, it raises the overall cost of commodi-
ties and thereby lowers the real after-tax wage. It therefore creates a
labor market distortion by widening the gap between the marginal social
value of labor (the real wage before taxes) and the private return to labor
(the real wage after taxes). Correspondingly, a consumer-level gasoline
tax raises the overall cost of the consumer's basket of commodities by
raising the price of one commodity, gasoline. Thus it also serves to
reduce the after-tax real wage.11
Moreover, energy taxes can directly distort the intertemporal margin
as well. Although energy taxes may not appear to be taxes on the return
to capital, they function as capital taxes and affect the intertemporal
margin insofar as they raise the costs of producing capital goods. Energy
is an important input into the production of capital goods, and thus a tax
imposed on the use of energy inputs into production (that is, a tax on
fuels) will raise these costs.12 The Btu tax is such a tax. Other things
being equal, this tax will reduce the rate of return to investment, because
the acquisition prices of capital goods will rise (without a compensating
increase in the after-tax of the returns to the services from these goods).
Thus, insofar as energy inputs are important to the production of capital
goods, a Btu tax functions as a tax on investment, or a negative invest-
ment tax credit.13 Not all energy taxes affect the intertemporal margin,
11The labor market distortion depends on the extent to which the after-tax real wage
differs from its value in a no-tax situation. The after-tax real wage is (1) the after-tax
nominal wage divided by (2) the gross of tax price of consumption. Income taxes directly
affect the after-tax real wage by reducing (1), whereas energy taxes directly influence this
wage by raising (2). For a further analysis of this and related labor market issues, see
Bovenberg and de Mooij (1993) and Poterba (1993).
12Policy simulations indicate, however, that the effects on capital goods prices are rela-
tively small. The Btu tax considered later in this paper ultimately raises oil and gas prices
by about 14 percent and refined product prices by about 8 percent, but leads to real
increases in capital goods prices of less than 0.4 percent.
13There is a difference between a Btu tax and personal income tax in their effects on "new"
and "old" capital. The income tax reduces the return to all capitalwhether previously
installed (old) or just acquired (new); a Btu tax reduces the return only on new capital, that
is, capital purchased since the introduction of the tax.Energy Taxes113
however. Consider a tax on consumer purchases of gasoline. This tax
does not directly affect the cost of producing capital goods or directly
alter the returns from investments in such goods. Hence it does not
introduce a distortion on this margin.14 In this respect, a consumption-
level gasoline tax shares the attraction associated with a more general
consumption tax of avoiding intertemporal distortions. These consider-
ations indicate that energy taxes may have very different (nonenviron-
mental) efficiency impacts depending on whether they are imposed at
the production stage or at the level of household consumption. We
investigate this issue numerically later in this paper.
The locations of the Xs under the energy tax columns in Table 1 reflect
these considerations. The central notion indicated by the table is that
energy taxes not only introduce distortions in product markets, but also induce
the sort of factor market distortions generated by income taxes. Of course, one
cannot ascertain the relative efficiency costs of energy and income taxes
merely by comparing the number of Xs associated with a given tax: the
relative costs depend on the magnitude of the distortions as well as their
number. It is tempting to suppose that energy taxes must generate much
smaller-factor market distortions than income taxes do, since energy
taxes have a much narrower tax base and generate less revenue. How-
ever, in assessing the relative gross costs of equal-revenue changes to
energy and income taxes, the relevant consideration is the gross effi-
ciency cost per dollar of revenue raised. As shown recently by Boven-
berg and de Mooij (1993), the narrowness of the energy-tax base actually
works toward larger gross distortions in factor markets from energy taxes
in comparison with income taxes. In addition, the narrower the base of
an energy tax, the larger the distortion introduced by the tax in the
markets for intermediate goods or consumer goods (as applicable).15
Hence, a narrower tax base serves to enlarge the gross efficiency costs of
energy taxes relative to equal-revenue income taxes.
Based on these considerations, one might suspect that the Btu tax will
involve larger gross efficiency costs than an equal revenue increment to
income taxes. Its factor market distortions could be comparable to those
generated by income taxes; at the same time it adds a distortion of its
own along the margin for input choice. A consumer-level gasoline tax, in
14A consumer-level gasoline tax can have indirect, general equilibrium effects on the
return to capital, despite the fact that it is not directly imposed on capital goods production
or on capital income. In comparing the efficiency impacts of the different taxes, one can
regard such indirect effects as second-order.
15A basic principle of public finance is that broader-based taxes tend to be more efficient
than more narrow-based ones. With a narrow-based tax, the tax rates must be higher than
under a broad-based tax to attain a given revenue target. Higher tax rates tend to imply
larger efficiency costs.114Goulder
contrast, might seem to have better prospects for involving lower gross
costs than income taxes. Like income taxes, the gasoline tax directly
distorts the labor market, but it avoids the capital market distortion
introduced by income taxes and the Btu tax because the consumer-level
gasoline tax does not raise the cost of producing capital goods.
Although these considerations may influence one's expectations of the
rankings of income and energy taxes in terms of their gross efficiency
costs, the rankings cannot be rigorously established a priori. Determin-
ing the rankings requires a numerical assessment.
2.1.2 A Note on the Monopsony Power Argument The monopsony
power argument has been invoked to support energy taxes. The United
States is a major demander of oil on the world market. To the extent that
an energy tax discourages U.S. demands for oil, it can help drive down
the world price of oil. Other things being equal, reductions in the pre-tax
price of imported oil are beneficial to domestic welfare, and compensate
for the costs of the tax to consumers of oil.
This argument does indeed provide a basis for policies to reduce U.S.
demands for imported oil. Provided that the United States exerts
monopsony power and the tax is not too high, a tax on oil can provide
efficiency gains. On the other hand, this issue does not provide support
for a broader energy tax such as the Btu tax we have discussed. The United
States is a net exporter of coal and its net imports of natural gas are not
large. The monopsony power argument does not apply to these fuels.
2.1.3 A Closer Look at the Issue of Commodity Market Distortions We
have asserted that by altering the relative rates of taxation of different
commodities, energy taxes introduce an efficiency cost on this margin, a
cost that is avoided by income taxes. Strictly speaking, whether the
effect on the intercommodity margin detracts from or adds to the appeal
of energy taxes in comparison with income taxes depends on two issues
that, to preserve the flow of the previous discussion, were glossed over
initially.
Is energy relatively lightly taxed initially?The first issue is whether,
under the status quo, energy is taxed relatively lightly in comparison
with other commodities. If so, then the energy tax could in fact lead to a
more efficient allocation of consumption between energy andother com-
modities, and the "intercommodity efficiency effect" of the energy tax
could be positive.16 It turns out, however, that it is difficult to make the
16This issue relies on the central notion from public finance that the distortionary cost of a
given tax is an increasing function of the rate of pre-existing taxes in the market in ques-Energy Taxes115
case that energy is more lightly taxed than other commodities. Favorable
tax rules had applied to depreciation and resource depletion in the oil
and gas extraction industries, but these rules were eliminated under the
Tax Reform Act of 1986. Moreover, specific forms of energy (such as
gasoline) face federal and state excise taxes that do not apply to most
other commodities. There is little basis for expecting that differences in
pre-existing tax rates would cause the intercommodity effect to contrib-
ute to rather than detract from the appeal of a new energy tax.
Is the supply of energy relatively inelastic?The other consideration is
whether energy supply and demand are relatively inelastic in compari-
son with other commodities. A basic principle of public finance is that,
other things being equal, for a given tax rate the excess burden (or
efficiency cost) is smaller the more inelastic the supply or demand of the
good upon which the tax is applied.17
This principle can be related to the intercommodity efficiency effect. If
energy is supplied more inelastically than other commodities, then a
given tax rate can potentially lead to a smaller efficiency cost when
applied to energy than when applied to other commodities. Under these
circumstances a tax on energy can potentially improve efficiency on the
intercommodity margin.18
Some analysts claim that the supply of energy is relatively inelastic. A
common argument is that, to a large extent, stocks of fossil fuels are
essentially fixed, so that the long-run supply of such fuels is highly inelas-
tic. This argument ignores an important distinction between the natural
supply of unrecovered reserves and the quantity of economically recover-
able (and thus extractable) reserves. Although the supply of unrecovered
reserves may be fixed, the quantity of economically recoverable reserves
may nonetheless be very elastic. Consider in particular the case of crude
tion. Abstracting from differences in elasticities of demand and supply across commodi-
ties, if pre-existing taxes on energy were lower than those on other commodities, then the
distortionary cost of an incremental increase in the energy tax would be less than that of an
incremental increase in other commodity taxes.
17This principle is consistent with the well-known Ramsey Rule of optimal commodity
taxation (Ramsey, 1927) that endorses taxes on commodities in inverse relation to the
elasticities of demand. The "inverse elasticity rule" is often misleading, however, because
it ignores cross-price elasticities of demand and adding-up restrictions that apply to con-
sumer demand systems. Indeed, Deaton (1979) and Auerbach (1985) have shown that
optimal commodity taxation involves uniform tax rates when utility functions are homo-
thetic and leisure and consumption are weakly separable. (See also Atkinson and Stiglitz,
1980, chapter 12.) For comprehensiveness, we include here a discussion of the relative
inelasticity of energy supply, but it should be recognized that under certain conditions this
issue has no bearing on whether higher taxes are justified on efficiency grounds.
18See Bovenberg and de Mooij (1993).116Goulder
oil. There is considerable heterogeneity across producers in terms of the
costs of extracting given amounts of fuel, reflecting the differences in
geological characteristics of different fields (oil depth, types of subsurface
minerals, etc.). When producers have different production costs, the
"rents" on produced oil will differ as well. Producers with especially low
production costs will earn large rents, while others, with high extraction
costs, will earn small ones. For some marginal producers, taxes on oil can
reduce the rent just enough to turn marginally profitable production un-
economic, meaning that the supply of oil is sensitive to taxes on oil, even
in the very long run. In other words, the commercial supply of nonrenew-
able resources is not completely inelastic.
Thus, it remains an open question whether supplies of energy are
more or less elastic than other commodities in general. The answer
depends, in each fossil-fuel industry, on the distribution of production
costs across producers, now and in the future. The empirical verification
of this notion has not yet been accomplished.19
In sum, though it is possible for energy taxes to improve efficiency on
the intercommodity margin, the conditions that would allow this result
to hold either do not apply or require a degree of empirical verification
that has yet to be established.
Overall, the theoretical considerations from this subsection do not
produce a clear winner on (nonenvironmental) efficiency grounds.
There are many dimensions along which energy taxes can be expected to
be more costly than increased income taxes. But there are at least some
dimensions in which energy taxes might be less costly. To gauge how
these different efficiency impacts add up, we need to adopt an empirical
analysis. We perform such an analysis in Section 4.
2.2 Environmental Considerations
2.2.1 Connections between Pollution Intensity and Environmental Im-
provement Environmental considerations might seem to favor energy
taxes. The argument is simple. If energy use is generally more damaging
to the environment than other activities, then an energy tax may be
19Jones and Bremmer (1990), considering supply effects for Texas wells over the period
1973-1983, report elasticities ranging from .13 to .38. Walls (1991) uses information on the
price responsiveness of exploration and drilling activity to project a supply elasticity of .15.
Interpreting these elasticities is inherently problematic because it is difficult to discern
whether the observed changes in supply represent permanent increments to the total
amount to be extracted from given reserves or temporary increases that, because of rising
extraction costs, will eventually be offset by future reductions in supply (so that there is no
increase in the total amount ultimately extracted). The supply elasticities relevant to the
efficiency discussion should measure permanent increments.Energy Taxes117
superior to the other taxes considered here because it targets the source
of the damage.
Later in this paper (Table 9) we provide evidence that supports the
conventional wisdom that energy use contributes disproportionately to
economy-wide emissions of important air pollutants. However, environ-
mental regulations complicate the connection between energy taxes and
changes in energy use. To the extent that pre-existing regulations con-
strain emissions of certain pollutants, higher energy taxes need not al-
ways lead to further reductions in these pollutants below the levels
mandated by regulations. Consider, for example, the sulphur dioxide
emissions from coal-fired electric power plants. Such emissions are regu-
lated through provisions of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments. To the
extent that an energy tax reduces demands for electricity, power plants
whose output levels fall can comply with the limits on total sulphur
dioxide with higher ratios of sulphur dioxide per unit of output. Such
plants need not "ratchet down" their emissions-output ratios as far as
they would if no tax were implemented. We return to this issue in the
next section.
2.2.2 Do We Know That "Small" Taxes Are Superior to the Alterna-
tives? The previous discussion suggested that energy taxes are likely to
be more costly than the alternatives in the nonenvironmental dimen-
sions. Thus, even if energy taxes are more environmentally beneficial
than the alternatives, the question remains as to whether they are more
efficient overall. One line of reasoning would suggest that they must be,
provided that the tax rate is not too high. Figure 1 is a typical diagram
indicating the costs and benefits from an environmental tax. The supply
S and demand D curves can be interpreted as the marginal private cost
and marginal benefit from energy use. The marginal external (or environ-
mental) cost from energy use is represented by MEC. Adding this mar-
ginal cost to private marginal cost yields the social marginal cost curve,
MSC. The shaded area in the diagram indicates the efficiency loss from
excessive use of energy when purchasers of energy do not face the
external costs. Here, introducing a small energy tax (for example, t1 in
diagram) helps reduce the differential between marginal social cost and
marginal private cost and shrinks the efficiency loss. So long as t1 does
not greatly exceed the marginal external cost, the tax will lead to benefits
in excess of costs. This suggests that so long as the energy tax rate is
conservative, that is, falls short of (or at least does not vastly exceed) the
marginal environmental cost, then the energy tax will pay for itself. An









FIGURE 1. Are "Small" Energy Taxes Guaranteed to Confer Efficiency
Gains?
This argument, though appealing, is not entirely valid. If no other
taxes are present in the economy, then the case can be made that a small
energy tax pays for itself. But in an economy with pre-existing taxes
whether in the energy markets or in other marketsthere is no guaran-
tee that small energy taxes will generate environmental gains larger than
the nonenvironmental efficiency costs. The issue here is reminiscent of
the notion, presented in subsection 2.1 above, that energy taxes can
generate large efficiency costs because they not only affect energy mar-
kets but also introduce distortions in labor markets (the dimension of
labor-leisure choice) and capital markets (the intertemporal dimension).
In general equilibrium, even small environmentally motivated taxes can
generate large efficiency costs through the distortions they introduce in
other markets. This notion receives support from analytical work by
Bovenberg and de Mooij (1993) and simulation work by Goulder (1993).
The upshot is that the existence of a net efficiency gain from an energy
taxeven a small onecannot be established on a priori grounds. Deter-
mining whether the tax yields net benefits and ascertaining the magni-
tude of the net benefit or cost relative to the net benefits or costs of
alternative policies requires empirical investigation.
2.2.3 National Security Benefits A potential benefit from energy taxes
is increased national security associated with reduced reliance on oil
imports. Under a broad definition of environmental, this might be consid-
ered an environmental benefit because it is external to the private bene-
fits underlying oil purchase and supply decisions.
The argument for national-security benefits turns on the idea that
reduced importation of oil implies smaller economic costs in the event of
a supply disruption. This benefit is extremely difficult to quantify, inEnergy Taxes119
part because of the difficulty of calculating the probability and magni-
tude of oil supply disruptions. In the spirit of comprehensiveness, we
mention this potential benefit here, but we do not attempt to quantify
the benefit in this paper.
2.3 Summary
All in all, the theoretical issues from this section paint a mixed picture
regarding the attractiveness of energy taxes in comparison with income
taxes. On the one hand, theory points out several ways in which energy
taxes might be more costly than the alternatives on nonenvironmental
(traditional macroeconomic) grounds. On the other hand, energy taxes
appear likely to have the advantage in the environmental domain. The
overall efficiency impact cannot be determined from theory alone. In
Section 4 we use a general equilibrium model to explore the magnitudes
of the traditional nonenvironmental impacts and evaluate some of the
environmental consequences.
3. BASIC FEATURES OF THE SIMULATION MODEL
We assess the effects of energy and income taxes using a general equilib-
rium model of the United States that incorporates international trade.
Here we sketch out some main features of the model. Details about the
model's structure and parameters are offered in the Appendix. A more
complete description is in Goulder (1992b).
The model generates paths of equilibrium prices, outputs, and in-
comes for the U.S. economy under specified policy scenarios. All vari-
ables are calculated at yearly intervals beginning in the 1990 benchmark
year and usually extending to the year 2070.
The model is unique in combining (1) a detailed treatment of the U.S.
tax system, (2) a close treatment of energy production and demand, and
(3) attention to stationary-source and mobile-source emissions of major
air pollutants. The representation of taxes incorporates very specific tax
instruments and addresses effects along a number of important dimen-
sions. These include effects on firms' investment incentives, equity val-
ues, and profits, and impacts on household consumption, saving, and
labor-supply decisions.2° The specification of energy supply includes an
attention to the nonrenewable nature of crude petroleum and natural
gas and a treatment of the transitions from conventional to synthetic
fuels. The treatment of emissions is based on historical relationships
between emissions and fuel used, processes employed, and levels of
output.
20The model applies the asset price approach to investment developed in Summers (1981).120Goulder
TABLE 2.
Industry and Consumer Good Categories.
Industries
Ariculture and Noncoal mining
Coal mining
























Recreation, Reading, and Miscellaneous
Nondurable, Non-food household expenditure
Gasoline and other fuels
Education
Health
3.1 Industry and Consumer Good Disaggregation
The model divides U.S. production into the 13 industries indicated in
Table 2. The energy industries consist of coal mining, crude petroleum
and natural-gas extraction, synthetic-fuels production, petroleum refin-
ing, electric utilities, and gas utilities. The model also distinguishes the
seventeen consumer goods in Table 2.
3.2 Producer Behavior
3.2.1 General SpecificationsIn each industry, a nested production
structure accounts for potential substitutions between different forms ofEnergy Taxes121
energy as well as between energy and other inputs. Each industry pro-
duces a distinct output X, which is a function of inputs of labor L, capital
K, an energy composite E, and a materials composite M, as well as the
current level of investment I:
X = f[g(L,K),h(E,M)] -(IIK)I. (1)
The energy composite is made up of the outputs of the six energy indus-
tries, and the materials composite is made up of the outputs of the other
industries:
E = E(2, X3 + X4, X5,...X7) (2)
M = M(1, X8,...x3), (3)
whereis a composite of domestically produced and foreign made
input i. Industry indices correspond to those provided in Table 2.21
Managers of firms are assumed to serve stockholders in aiming to
maximize the value of the firm; this objective guides the choices of input
quantities and investment levels in each period of time. The model incor-
porates capital adjustment dynamics. In equation (1), çb(I/K).I repre-
sents capital adjustment (or installation) costs; these are an increasing
function of the rate of investment.
3.2.2 Special Features of the Oil-Gas and Synfuels IndustriesThe pro-
duction structure in the oil and gas industry is somewhat more complex
than in other industries to account for the nonrenewable nature of oil
and gas stocks. The production specification is
X = y(Z) . f[g(L,K),h(E,M)} - çt(IIK)I, (4)
21The functions f, g, and h, and the aggregation functions for the composites E, M, and
are CES in form. Consumer goods are produced by combining outputs from the thirteen
industries in given proportions.
The cost function, çb, represents adjustment costs per unit of investment. This function
is convex in I/K (see Appendix) and expresses the notion that installing new capital necessi-
tates a loss of current output, as existing inputs (K, L, F and M) that otherwise would be
used to produce output are diverted to install the new capital. Here adjustment costs are
internal to the firm. For a discussion of this and other adjustment cost specifications, see
Mussa (1978). In choosing the optimal rate of investment, producers must balance the
marginal costs of current investment (both the acquisition costs and installation costs of
new capital) with the marginal benefits (the stream of increased dividends made possible
by a higher future capital stock).122Goulder
where y is a decreasing function of Z, the amount of cumulative extrac-
tion (or output) of oil and gas up to the beginning of the current period.
This equation captures the fact that as Z rises (or, equivalently, as re-
serves are depleted), it becomes increasingly difficult to extract oil and
gas resources, so that greater quantities of K, L, E, and M are required to
achieve any given level of extraction (output). Increasing production
costs ultimately induce oil and gas producers to remove their capital
from this industry.
The model incorporates a synthetic fuel, shale oil, as a backstop re-
source, a perfect substitute for oil and gas.24 As in other industries, in the
synfuels industry producers choose input and investment levels to maxi-
mize the equity value of the firm. There is one difference, however. The
technology for producing synthetic fuels on a commercial scale is as-
sumed to become known only in the year 2010. Thus, capital formation
in the synfuels industry cannot begin until the year 2010.
All domestic prices in the model are endogenous, except for the do-
mestic price of oil and gas. The latter is given by the exogenous world
price of oil and gas plus whatever oil tariff may apply. According to the
baseline assumptions of the Stanford Energy Modeling Forum, this
world price is specified as $24 per barrel in 1990 and rising in real terms
by $6.50 per decade. At any given point in time, the supply of imported
oil and gas is taken to be perfectly elastic at the given world price. So
long as imports are the marginal source of supply to the domestic econ-
omy, domestic producers of oil and gas receive the world price (adjusted
for tariffs or taxes) for their own output. However, rising oil and gas
prices stimulate investment in synfuels. Eventually, synfuels production
plus the domestic supply of oil and gas satisfy all of domestic demand.
Synfuels then become the marginal source of supply, and the cost of
synfuels production rather than the world oil price dictates the domestic
price of fuels.26
23The attention to resource stock effects distinguishes this model from several other gen-
eral equilibrium, energy-environmental models. Many equilibrium models treat the domes-
tic oil-and-gas industry as a constant-returns-to-scale production, disregarding resource
stock effects or fixed factors (see, for example, Jorgenson and Wilcoxen [1990, 1993]). In
their global energy-environment model, Manne and Richels (1992) impose stock limits on
resources such as oil and gas, but these limits have no effect on production costs prior to
the point where the resource is exhausted.
24Thus, inputs 3 (oil and gas) and 4 (synfuels) enter additively in the energy aggregation
function shown in equation (2).
See Gaskins and Weyant (1993).
26For details, see Goulder (1993).3.3 Household Behavior
Consumption, labor supply, and saving result from the decisions of a
representative household maximizing its intertemporal utility. The house-
hold maximizes utility, subject to the intertemporal budget constraint
requiring that the present value of the consumption stream not exceed
potential total wealth (current nonhuman wealth plus the present value of
potential labor income and net transfers). In each period, overall consump-
tion of goods and services is allocated across the seventeen specific con-
sumption categories of Table 2. Each of the seventeen consumption goods
is a composite of a domestically and foreign-produced consumption good
of that type. Households substitute between domestic and foreign goods
to minimize the cost of obtaining a given composite good.
3.4 The Government Sector
The government collects taxes, distributes transfers, and purchases
goods and services (outputs of the thirteen industries).
The model incorporates a wide array of tax instruments, including
energy taxes, output taxes, the corporate income tax, property taxes,
sales taxes, and taxes on individual labor and capital income.
In the benchmark year, 1990, there is a government deficit equal to
approximately 2 percent of GNP. In the reference case (or status quo)
simulation, the deficit-GNP ratio is approximately constant. In the policy
experiments in this paper, we require that real government spending
and the real deficit follow the same path as in the reference case, imply-
ing that, to meet the cash flow requirement, the real tax revenues col-
lected under the various policies must be the same as in the reference
case. Ordinarily, the policies considered in this papernew energy
taxes or increases to income taxeswould lead to an increase in tax
revenue (relative to the reference case) in the absence of some other tax
adjustment. To make these policies revenue neutral, we accompany the
rate increases that define the various policies with reductions in other
taxes, either on a lump-sum basis or through reductions in other tax
rates.
3.5 Foreign Trade
Except for oil and gas imports, which are perfect substitutes for domes-
tically produced oil and gas, imported intermediate and consumer
goods are imperfect substitutes for their domestic counterparts.27 As
27Thus, we adopt the assumption of Armington (1969).
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indicated above, demands for foreign intermediate inputs stem from
cost-minimizing producer behavior, whereas demands for foreign con-
sumer goods derive from household utility maximization. Import prices
are exogenous in foreign currency, but the domestic-currency price
changes with the exchange rate.
Export demands are modeled as functions of the foreign price of U.S.
exports and the level of foreign income (in foreign currency). The foreign
price is the price in U.S. dollars plus tariffs or subsidies, converted to
foreign currency through the exchange rate. We impose the assumption
of zero trade balance at each period of time. The exchange rate variable
adjusts to achieve trade balance, that is, to reconcile the value of U.S.
import demands with the value of foreign export demands.
3.6 Modeling Pollution Emissions
Recent extensions of the model enable it to project emissions of important
pollutants under different policy circumstances. The model considers
eight major pollutants: total suspended particles (TSP), sulphur oxides
(SOX), nitric oxides (NOX), volatile organic compounds (V005), carbon
monoxide (CU), lead (Pb), particulate matter (PM10), and carbon dioxide
(CU2).
The extension of the model to project emissions was accomplished
through close collaborations with personnel at the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency and the Environmental Law Institute. We have made
use of detailed, highly disaggregated data on emissions rates forspecific
industrial processes and fuels.28
The key parameters used to project emissions levels (under baseline
assumptions or in response to a change of policy) are emissions factors. The
model includes three types of emissions factors: fuel-based factors,
output-based factors, and mobile-source-based factors. The fuel-based
emissions factor e_fi,j,k represents the rate of emissions of pollutant i per
unit of input of fuelj used in industry k.29 Fuel-based emissions factors do
28These data come from a wide variety of sources, including the Annual Survey of Manu-
facturers from the U.S. Department of Census, the Quarterly Coal Report and Petroleum
Supply Report from the U.S. Department of Energy, and the Minerals Yearbook. Person-
nel at the Environmental Law Institute (ELI) organized the detailed emissions data and
aggregated these data to conform to the thirteen-industry and seventeen-consumer good
aggregation of this model.
29In each industry, we take the ratio of the fuel-associated emissions to the quantity of fuel
used in a given industry to obtain the fuel-based emissions factor for each pollutant from
that industry. We calculate this ratio in 1990, based on ELI data on fuel-associated emis-
sions and the general equilibrium model's data on fuel use. Thus, for example, the emis-
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not account for all of the emissions of a given pollutant from a given
industry. Industrial emissions over and above those that can be attributed
to given fuels are deemed output based. The output-based emissions
factore_o,kdenotes the ratio of output-related emissions of pollutant ito
the quantity of gross output from industry k.3° The mobile-source emis-
sions factors e_m are expressed as the ratio of emissions i from a given
mobile source to the level of use of that source (vehicle).31
By applying the emissions factors to the levels of fuels used and levels
of outputs produced in each industry, we generate the predicted levels
of emissions of each pollutant from each industry. Changes in emissions
stemming from a policy change reflect the policy-induced changes in
fuel use and output levels.32
3.7 Equilibrium and Growth
The solution of the model is a general equilibrium in which supplies and
demands balance in all markets at each period of time. Thus the solution
utilities industry was calculated by taking the ratio of observed 1990 TSP emissions from
coal used in electric utilities to the quantity of coal used by electric utilities in 1990.
30 We calculate the output-based emissions factors by taking the ratio of the residual
emissions to the level of industry output. As with the fuel-based emissions factors, the
ratio is calculated based on 1990 data on emissions from ELI and on industry outputs from
the general equilibrium model's data set.
31 We aggregated data on emissions from very specific sources to obtain total emissions for
each pollutant from the following mobile-source categories: (1) passenger vehicles, (2)
other highway vehicles, (3) farm equipment, (4) construction equipment, and (5) other
mobile sources. Because the model does not measure vehicle use directly, we use proxies
for vehicle use to determine mobile-source emissions. Gasoline consumption is the proxy
for the quantity of passenger car and other highway vehicle use. Agriculture output,
construction industry output, and services industry output are proxies for the level of use
of farm equipment, construction equipment, and other mobile sources, respectively.
This approach is not perfect. One loses potentially important information when detailed
industrial processes are aggregated to the level in the model. Even though the model has
considerable industry- and consumer-good disaggregation, it masks some important detail
that is highly relevant to emissions levels. Many important contributions to emissions stem
from industries or industrial processes that are more detailed than can be captured in this
thirteen-industry, seventeen-consumer good model. In addition, we assume that emis-
sions factors do not change over time; hence the model does not aptly capture industry-
specific technological change that may alter these factors over time.
Moreover, this approach, which assumes that emissions are proportional to fuel uses
and industry outputs, does not directly address ways that environmental regulations
might affect emissions rates. We make one adjustment in this approach to confront this
issue: we assume that aggregate emissions of sulphur dioxide from coal-fired electric
power plants are constrained by the provisions of the 1990 Clean Air Act. Thus, tax policies
cannot reduce this particular emission from this particular source. To the extent that taxes
reduce demands for electricity from these plants, the reduced electricity output does not
lead to a reduction in SO2 emissions. The reduced output instead enables electric-power
producers to meet the aggregate emissions constraint somewhat more easily.126Goulder
requires that supply equal demand for labor inputs and for all produced
goods,33 that firms' demands for loanable funds equal the aggregate
supply by households, and that the government's tax revenues equal its
spending less the current deficit. These conditions are met through ad-
justments in output prices, in the market interest rate, and in lump-sum
taxes or tax rates.
Economic growth reflects the growth of capital stocks and of potential
labor resources. The growth of capital stocks stems from endogenous
saving and investment behavior. Potential labor resources are specified
as increasing at a constant rate. In each period, potential labor divides
between hours worked and leisure time in accordance with utility-
maximizing household decisions.
3.8 Data and Parameters
Complete data documentation for the model is provided in Cruz and
Goulder (1992). In the present subsection we indicate the sources for
some important data and parameters.
The data stem from several sources. Industry input and output flows
(used to establish production function share parameters) were obtained
from 1986 input-output tables published in the February 1991 Survey of
Current Business. These tables were also the source for consumption,
investment, government spending, import and export values by indus-
try. The initial period for the simulations of this paper is the year 1990.
To obtain 1990 values, we scaled up the 1986 data using information for
major industry groups in the 1991 Economic Report of the President. For the
oil and gas, coal, and petroleum refining industries, further adjustments
were made to make the relative 1990 values correspond closely to rela-
tive values projected for 1988 by the OECD (see OECD!IEA, 1990).
Elasticities of substitution for industry production functions were ob-
tained by transforming translog production-function parameters esti-
mated by Dale Jorgenson and Peter Wilcoxen. Elasticities of substitution
between domestic and foreign goods were obtained by aggregating esti-
mates from Shiells, Stern, and Deardorff (1986).
Because oil and gas and synfuels are perfect substitutes, they generate a single supply-
demand condition.
When oillgas imports are the marginal source of supply for the domestic economy, the
quantity of these imports is an equilibrating variable, and the off/gas price is exogenous.
Once synfuels become the marginal source of supply (that is, once synfuels drive oi]lgas
imports to zero), the synfuels price becomes an equilibrating variable.
Since agents are forward looking, equilibrium in each period depends not only on
current prices and taxes but on future magnitudes as well.Energy Taxes127
The Appendix to this paper indicates functional forms and lists pa-
rameter values for the production and household sectors.
4. SIMULATION EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
In this section we describe simulation experiments performed to com-
pare effects of energy and other taxes. In addition, we report and inter-
pret the simulation results.
4.1 Policies Considered
To assess the impacts of policy changes, we compare results under each
simulation of a policy change with results from a baseline or reference-
case simulation (which assumes no change in tax policy). In the baseline
simulation, all tax rates remain constant through time.
We simulate the following four policies:
A Btu tax. This is a tax imposed on oil, natural gas, and coal in
proportion to the Btu content of these fuels.35 The same tax rates
apply to imported fuels as to the domestically produced counterparts.
Exports are exempt from the tax.36
A gasoline tax. This is a specific, or per-unit, tax on the purchases of
gasoline by consumers. "Gasoline and other fuels" is one of the seven-
teen consumer goods distinguished in the model. The gasoline tax is
applied to household purchases of this good.
An increase in marginal rates of the personal income tax. The model includes
marginal tax rates on individual wage income, dividend income, inter-
est income, and capital gains income. These are the average marginal
rates that apply in the benchmark year, 1994. Under the policy of an
increase in personal income taxes, each of these marginal rates is in-
creased in the same proportion.
An increase in the corporate income-tax rate. This is an increase in the rate
of tax on corporate profits.
The model treats crude petroleum and natural gas together as a single industry. It was
still possible, however, to capture the different tax rates applying to these fuels, because
nearly all crude petroleum serves as an input into the petroleum refining industry. Thus
the industry 3 (crude petroleum and natural gas industry) inputs into industries other than
petroleum refining faced a tax equal to the tax rate on natural gas, in keeping with the fact
that very little crude oil (except for some feedstocks) is used outside of the petroleum
industry. In contrast, industry 3 inputs into the petroleum refining industry faced a tax
reflecting the share of natural gas and crude oil as inputs into petroleum refining.
This avoids putting U.S.-produced fuels at a cost disadvantage relative to imported fuels
in the domestic market, and avoids putting exported U.S. fuels at a cost disadvantage
relative to foreign-produced fuels in the international market.128Goulder
TABLE 3.
Tax Rates under Energy and Income Tax Policies.
Note: Policies are scaled to imply the same gross revenue impact. Numbers that differ from reference
case values are shown in bold face. Income tax rates represent nominal dollars collected per dollar of
nominal income. Energy tax rates express real (1990) dollars collected per energy or physical unit (Btu's,
gallons).
Table 3 indicates the tax rates employed under the baseline and policy-
change scenarios. The rates shown for the policy changes are after the
policy in question is fully phased in. All policies are phased in over a
three-year period, beginning in 1994.
Each of these policies is introduced in a revenue-neutral fashion: the
path of tax revenues under each policy is made identical to the revenue
path in the baseline. In the absence of compensating tax reductions, new
energy taxes or higher income tax rates generally would lead to higher
overall government revenues. To assure revenue neutrality, we accom-
pany the rate increases with compensating tax reductions either through
lump-sum reductions in personal income taxes or by way of reductions
in the marginal tax rates on individual income.
For comparability, the policies are scaled to imply the same gross reve-
nue impactthe same revenue yield, abstracting from the revenue-
preserving reductions in other taxes. The gross revenue impact of these
policies, over the infinite time horizon, is $1,155 billion in present value.
Over the first five years, these taxes yield gross revenues ranging from
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4.2 Simulation Results: "Traditional" Effects
4.2.1 Differences in Aggregate Economic ImpactsFigures 2a-2c show
the effects of the alternative policies on real GNP, consumption, and
investment. These results are from experiments with lump-sum replace-
ment of revenues. The figures indicate the percentage change in these
variables relative to a reference case involving no policy change. The first
year corresponds to 1994.
Figure 2a compares the GNP effects. Within the first twelve years
following implementation, the Btu and gasoline taxes imply larger reduc-
tions in GNP than the income tax alternatives. For example, in the year
2000 (six years after implementation), the Btu and gas taxes imply GNP
reductions (relative to baseline) of about 0.22 and 0.18 percent, as com-
pared with 0.14 and 0.07 percent under the personal and corporate tax
increases. The GNP costs of the Btu tax remain larger than those of the
income tax alternatives. In contrast, the GNP cost of the gasoline tax
eventually becomes smaller than that of the personal tax increase. The
relatively benign long-term GNP impact of the gasoline tax reflects its
more favorable impact on investment, as discussed below.
The impacts on consumption are compared in Figure 2b. As with the
GNP losses, the losses in consumption are greatest for the energy tax
policies. However, in contrast with the GNP results, the losses here are
greater for the gasoline tax than for the Btu tax. While the Btu tax raises
the costs of production for intermediate, capital, and consumer goods,
the gasoline tax is targeted to consumption. Thus, in comparison with
the Btu tax, under the gasoline tax the GNP reductions come in the form
of reduced consumption rather than reduced investment.
Figure 2c contrasts the investment impacts. The investment losses of
the gasoline tax are less severe than those of any of the other policies.
Hence the path of the capital stock is higher under the gasoline tax than
under the other policies. This helps explain why, over time, the GNP
path under the gasoline tax improves relative to the paths under the
other policies.
There are various ways to discern economic well-being from the pre-
ceding figures. One way is to apply the equivalent-variation measure,
which translates changes in consumption from a given policy into a
dollar equivalent.37 The welfare costs of the different policies are given in
The equivalent-variation measure used here is the amount that a dynastic or infinitely-
lived household would require under the status quo to be made as well off as under the
policy change. It is a single number that consolidates the welfare impacts from changes in
current and future consumption. As applied here, this measure does not address equity
issues as reflected in changes in the distribution of well-being across household income
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FIGURE 2. Aggregate Effects of Energy and Income Tax Policies (Per-
centage Changes from Reference Cases).
Table 4. To give a perspective on the magnitude of these numbers, the
welfare cost of the Btu tax with lump-sum income tax replacement is
shown as 0.394. This tax is roughly equivalent to a permanent reduc-
lion in consumption of about 0.39 percent.
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Lump-sum reduction marginal rates of
Policy in personal taxes personal income tax
Btu tax - .394 - .238
Gasoline tax increase .334 - .176
Raised personal income tax - .161 -
rates
Raised corporate tax rates - .156 .006
Note: The welfare effect is expressed by the equivalent variation ss a percentage of lifetime resources
(present value of capital and labor income) under the status quo. These welfare assessments disregard
welfare benefits from reduced environmental damages.
The numbers in Table 4 indicate that the energy taxes have larger
welfare costs than the income tax alternatives. The Btu tax implies the
largest welfare cost. The rankings of welfare costs correspond to the
differences in consumption paths from Figure 2b.38 It should be kept in
mind that these welfare measures abstract from the possible welfare
benefits associated with policy-induced improvements in the environ-
ment (or avoided environmental damages).
4.2.2 Explaining the Differences in Aggregate ImpactsThe above re-
sults indicate that the Btu and gasoline taxes tend to impose larger costs
in terms of consumption, welfare, and GNP than the two income-tax
alternatives. It is important to ascertain how these cost differences arise.
Here we harken back to the issues raised in section 2. How significant is
it that energy taxes apply to a relatively narrow set of industries? How
important is the fact that, in contrast with income taxes, a Btu tax applies
to intermediate inputs? And how much difference does it make whether
an energy tax applies to consumer goods as opposed to all final goods?
It is possible to address these questions by performing some addi-
tional simulations designed to isolate the different dimensions along
which energy and other taxes differ.
Welfare depends on the household's enjoyment of both consumer goods and leisure. To
the extent that leisure changes are imperfectly correlated with the changes in consumption
from Figure 2b, the values in the figure will not be perfect indicators of welfare changes.132Goulder
TABLE 5.
Significance of Alternative Tax Bases.
% Change GNP
2000 2020 Welfare
Policy (year 7) (year 27) change*
The measure of welfare change is the equivalent variation as a percentage of lifetime income.
Significance of the breadth of the tax baseOne important feature of
energy taxes, in comparison with income taxes, isthat their tax bases are
relatively narrow. The Btu tax applies only to a few industrial outputs
the outputs of the oil, natural gas, coal, and synthetic fuels industries.
These industries account for less than 3 percent of the value of the
nation's gross output. Similarly, consumer purchases of gasoline ac-
count for a very small share of household expenditure on goodsand
services.
To consider the importance of the breadth of base, we perform two
new simulations. First, we simulate auniform, broad-based tax on gross
output with the same gross revenue impact as the taxes alreadyconsid-
ered. Since the Btu tax is also a tax on gross output (of oil, natural gas,
and coal), the main structural difference between the broad-based tax
and the Btu tax is the breadth of the base. Second, we simulate a uniform
general consumption taxapplying to all consumer goods, not just con-
sumer purchases of gasoline. This isolates the significanceof the breadth
of the tax base at the level of household consumption.
Table 5 compares the GNP and welfare impacts of these new policies
with those under the policies already considered. The excess cost of the
Btu tax over the personal tax increase is 0.233; in contrast, the excess cost
of the broad output tax over the personal tax increase is 0.086. Thus,
about two thirds ([0.233 - 0.0861/ 0.233) of the Btu tax's excess cost can
be attributed to its relatively narrow industrial base.39 For the consumer-
The broad-based output tax is imposed as a specific, or per-unit tax, where units are
defined as that quantity of output worth $1 in 1990. A subtle difference between the broad-
based output tax and the Btu tax is that the latter tax is not uniform with respect to quantity
units (or 1990 dollars' worth of output); instead, it is specified as uniform with respect to
energy content. In further simulation experiments, we compare theeffects of the Btu tax
already considered with those of a "strictly uniform" Btu taxa tax with the same rates per
Btu tax 0.215 0.35 1 0.394
Broad output tax 0.200 0.314 0.247
Gasoline tax increase 0.177 0.194 0.334
Broad consumption tax 0.138 0.177 0.084
Personal income tax increase 0.138 0.265 0.161Energy Taxes133
level gasoline tax, the breadth of base is important as well,as is clear
from a comparison of rows 3 and 4 of Table 5. Whereas the gasolinetax
leads to a welfare cost about twice as large as that under the incometax,
the general consumption tax produces a smaller welfare loss than under
the income tax increasethe "excess cost" is negative. This fact suggests
that financing a general consumption tax with cuts in the personal in-
come tax would yield a net welfare gain.40
Significance of taxing gross, rather than net, outputThe overall differ-
ence between a Btu tax and the personal income tax can be decomposed
into (1) the difference between a tax on particular industry outputs (fu-
els) and a tax on all industry gross outputs, and (2) the difference be-
tween a tax on all gross outputs and a tax on all final goods (the income
tax). The welfare importance of the first of these differenceswas seen by
comparing the results in rows 1 and 2 of Table 5, as discussed in the
previous paragraph. The significance of the second of these differences
is indicated from a comparison of the results in rows 2 and 5 of the table,
which indicate that about a third (0.086 / 0.233) of the difference in GNP
and welfare costs between the Btu and personal income tax is attribut-
able to this second dimension.
Significance of taxing consumption goods rather than all final goodsTable 5
affords another useful comparison. The overall difference betweena
gasoline tax and the personal income tax can be decomposed into (1) the
difference between a tax on a particular consumer good (gasoline) anda
tax on all consumer goods, and (2) the difference between a tax on all
consumer goods and a tax on all final goods (the income tax). The first of
these differences was already observed by comparingrows 3 and 4 of
Table 5. It is clear that the first difference has a negative impact relative
to the personal income tax. The second of these differences is seen by
comparing rows 4 and 5. The table shows that the narrow consumption
base of the gasoline tax exerts a strong negative welfare impact. In fact,
the narrowness of the base is important enough to undo the positive
unit of output. The differences in welfare effects are small. The strictly uniform Btu tax
generated a welfare loss of 0.375, as opposed to 0.394 under the original Btu tax, and 0.246
under the broad-based gross output tax. With this information, a small fraction of the
excess cost now attributed to the narrowness of the base can be attributed to the lack of
strict uniformity. Recall that the excess cost of the ordinary Btu tax is 0.233. The results
from the strictly uniform Btu tax imply that the lack of strict uniformity accounts for about 8
percent ([0.394-0.3751/0.233) of the excess cost, and that the narrowness of the baseac-
counts for about 55 percent ([0.375-0.246]/0.233) of this cost.
° Subsequent simulation experiments confirm this suggestion.134Goulder
TABLE 6.
The "Excess" Costs of Energy Taxes: A Decomposition.
Note: The overall excess cost (lines 1 and 2) is the difference in the welfare impact of the energy taxin
question and a personal tax increase of equal revenue yield. The decomposition ofoverall excess cost is
based on the following comparisons:
Line la: Difference in welfare cost of broad-based output tax and the income tax increase.
Line ib: Difference between excess costs of line I and line la.
Line 2a: Difference in welfare cost of broad-based consumption tax and the income tax increase.
Line 2b: Difference between excess costs of line 2 and line 2a.
welfare impact (relative to an income tax) of taxing consumption in
general.
Table 6 consolidates these findings. It shows the contributions ofeach
of the above dimensions to the differences in overall welfare impacts
between the energy taxes and the personal income tax. The relatively
narrow base of both the Btu tax andgasoline tax accounts for the greatest
share of their excess cost over a personal income tax increase. Theother
key feature of the gasoline tax, its focus on consumption goods, narrows
the excess cost of this policy; in contrast, the other key feature of the Btu
tax, its focus on intermediate goods rather thanfinal goods, enlarges its
excess cost over an income tax. Thisgeneral pattern of results is sus-
tained through further simulation experiments.4' These results arequali-
For example, we find that this pattern is the same regardless of the scale ofthe tax
policies. We have performed experiments in which the scale (or gross-revenueyield) of the
policies is 0.5, 2, and 4 times that considered in the main experiments. The rankingsof the
policies, as well as the relative significance of the various structural features, remainthe
same as in the original experiments.
In addition, we have examined the effects of a tax imposed on industrial usersof gaso-
line. This latter tax represents a narrowly based gross output tax. This tax (scaled toimply






a. Intermediate goods base 0.086 37
rather than final goods
base
b. Narrow rather than broad in- 0.147 63
termediate goods base
2. Gasoline tax increase 0.173
a. consumption goods base +0.077 44
rather than final goods
base
b. narrow rather than broad con- 0.250 144
sumption goods baseEnergy Taxes135
tatively similar to those obtained by Rotemberg and Woodford (1993) in
a more aggregated model that addresses issues of imperfect competition.
These authors find that the costs of energy taxesare considerably lower
when the taxes are applied at the household level only,as compared
with when the taxes are applied on all energyuse.
Two important qualifications are in order. First, it is important to keep
in mind that these results ignore environmental effects;we consider
such effects later in this section. In addition, these results, strictly speak-
ing, only indicate the relative impacts of marginal reformstax changes
that are superimposed on the existing tax structure; they do not directly
compare the effects of pure tax systems in which the tax base takes just
one form (energy, gasoline use, or income).
4.2.3 Further Sensitivity AnalysisTable 7 shows the sensitivity of re-
sults to key parameters. We concentrate on parameters thatgovern the
relative significance of the various margins discussed in the theoretical
section of the paper.
The intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption regulates
the responsiveness of household savings to changes in interest rates.
The higher the value of this elasticity, the greater is the potential for
efficiency or welfare losses under policies that distort the capital market,
or intertemporal allocation of resources. Higher values for this elasticity
imply larger welfare costs per dollar for the energy tax policies and for
the personal income tax increase. As this elasticity increases, welfare
costs rise less for the consumer-level gasoline tax than for the income tax;
hence the excess cost declines with an increase in this elasticity. This
outcome is in keeping with the fact that the income tax is inferior to this
gasoline tax on the intertemporal margin, and the higher elasticity raises
the significance of this margin. A higher intertemporal elasticity in-
creases somewhat the excess costs of the Btu tax, although the effect is
not so strong.
A higher elasticity of labor supply raises the potential magnitude of
efficiency losses along the labor-leisure margin. Higher values for this
elasticity raise the welfare costs per dollar of all three taxes shown here.
The excess costs of both energy taxes decline with increases in this
elasticity, indicating that income taxes tend to distort the labor-leisure
margin more than the energy taxes do.
Higher energy demand elasticities imply a greater potential for effi-
-0.442, which is consistent with the results from tables 5 and 6. As under the Btu tax, the











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ciency losses along the margin of producer choice betweenenergy in-
puts and the margin of consumer choice between energy products (such
as gasoline) and other consumer goods. Because energy taxes distort this
margin more than income taxes (subject to the qualifications of section
2), it is no surprise that the excess cost of theenergy taxes rise with
increases in energy demand elasticities.
Interestingly, although certain parameter values reduced theexcess
costs of the energy taxes significantly, in no cases were theexcess costs
eliminated. Apparently, the narrowness of the economic base of these
taxes (and, in the case of the Btu tax, the focus on intermediate produc-
tion) is enough to generate excess costs along a wide range ofparameter
values 42
4.2.4 Effects on Particular IndustriesThe focus of this paper is on
economy-wide impacts. However, as is evident in the following discus-
sion, there are significant differences in the pollution impacts of the
policy alternatives, and such differences are explained by differentpat-
terns of industry impacts. Thus, in Table 8 we present the effects of the
energy and income taxes on the gross outputs of each industry. These
results stem from the experiments in whichrevenue neutrality is accom-
plished through lump-sum reductions in personal taxes.
The distribution of impacts across industries is quite differentacross
policies. As one might expect, the effectson gross output under the two
energy taxes are much more concentrated. Under the gasoline tax, the
industrial effects are the most concentrated, with the petroleum refining
industry (whose activities include the processing of gasoline)experienc-
ing the greatest impact by far. Under the Btu tax, effectsare concentrated
among the fossil-fuels industries, petroleum-refining industry, and the
electric- and gas-utilities industries. In contrast, under the two income-
tax policies the effects are much more evenly dispersed.
4.3 Emissions Impacts
4.3.1 Comparison of Results across Policies An ideal comparison of
efficiency effects of energy and income taxes would incorporatevalue
measures of the economic benefits from reduced pollution. The tradi-
tional efficiency costs from a given policy would be subtracted from the
value of the environmental benefits, producing the net efficiency gainor
loss. However, the values of the environmental benefitsare largely un-
42 Further sensitivity analysis is performed in Bovenberg and Goulder(1993) for quite
similar policies. That analysis examines the sensitivity of excess costs to the rates ofpre-
existing taxes on labor and capital. Under the range of tax rates considered,energy taxes


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































known. Although valuing the environmental impacts isa worthwhile
pursuit, at present it seems more sensible to takea first step toward that
goal, namely, assessing the different emissions impacts of thedifferent
policies. To our knowledge, no other general equilibriumstudy has
linked the economy-wide impacts of theseor other tax reforms to the
emissions impacts
The different distributions of output effects shown in Table 8translate
into differences in emissions impacts to the extent that industriesvary in
their "pollution intensities," that is, in pollution emissionsper unit of
output.Table 9 provides information on pollution intensities. It shows
the relative emissions contributions from the different industriesof the
model in the baseline or reference case. These intensitiesare not exoge-
nous inputs to the model; rather, they are functions of the underlying
emissions factors, input choices, and output levels for each industry and
household activity. Results in the tableare for the year 2000 in the
baseline. For SOX, NOX, and CO2.energy industries account for the
lion's share of emissions. For thisreason one might expect the energy
taxeswhich have significant impactson these industriesto induce
much larger emissions reductions than income taxes of equalrevenue
yield.
This expectation is borne out by the policy impacts shownin tables lOa
and lOb, which show the emissions reductions stemmingfrom the four
policies in the years 2000 (Table lOa) and 2020 (Table lob).The differ-
ences in emissions impacts between the energy-tax and income-tax poli-
cies are striking. For every pollutant, the emissions reductionunder the
Btu or gasoline tax is at least nine times larger than undereither of the
income-tax policies. Under the energy taxes, the reductions inemissions
are much larger in percentage terms than the reductions in overalleco-
nomic output (GNP) and reflect substitutions of cleaner activitiesand
fuels for those involving more pollution.
In percentage terms, the emissions reductions from theBtu tax are
largest for CO2 and NOX compounds. Whereas the Btutax induces
significant reductions from both stationary and mobilesources, the gaso-
line tax (as expected) promotes reductions mainly frommobile sources.
Argonne National Laboratories is currently developing a model that explores the
economy-wide emissions impacts of alternative energy policies. The model hasconsider-
able detail on energy technologies, but it does not havea general equilibrium structure,
although it attends to some important market interactions.
To gauge the emissions impacts of different policies, it does not sufficeto observe the
changes in industrial output and the status quo pollution intensities. Thisis the case
because pollution intensities also change in response to policy initiatives. As discussedin









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The gasoline tax leads to substantial reductions in mobile-source emis-
sions of all pollutants except particulate matter (PM10) and carbon diox-
ide (CO2).
Overall, these results offer evidence that Btu and gasoline taxes afford
significant environmental benefits relative to increases in income taxes,
which complicates the ranking of energy and income taxes in terms of
overall efficiency. As yet, we do not have the information to determine
whether the larger emissions reductions from energy taxes are impor-
tant enough to offset the disadvantages of these taxes on narrower effi-
ciency grounds.
4.3.2. A Partial Benefit-Cost AnalysisDespite the information limita-
tions, some useful comparisons are possible. Table 11 offers partial
benefit-cost information. The first row shows the average annual emis-
sions reductions from the two energy tax policies.45 To give an idea of
the levels (tons) of emissions reductions implied by these percentages,
we apply the average reductions to projected 1994 (baseline) emissions
and present the implied reductions in the second row of the table. As in
previous tables, the units in row 2 are thousands of metric tons for all
pollutants except lead (which is in metric tons) and CO2 (which is in
millions of metric tons of carbon).
In the second portion of this table, we make suggestive benefit-cost
comparisons. Row 3 presents the annualized excess cost of the two
energy-tax policies. This cost index translates the overall excess cost (a
stock concept) into an annual cost flow that grows at the long-run
growth rate of the economy.46
In row 4, we make a tentative foray into the benefits dimension.
Several caveats are in order here. First, we only consider CO2-related
benefits. Obviously this limitation understates the overall environmen-
tal benefits. Our purpose is simply to consider what portion of the GNP
costs might be offset by CO2-related benefits and to allow readers to
More precisely, these are averages of the excess reductions in CO2 emissions over and
above the (negligible) reductions that would occur from a personal income-tax increase.
The averages are computed by taking the present value of the changes in emissions over an
infinite horizon, using the long-run after-tax interest rate (4.8 percent) as the discount rate.
An alternative approach is simply to treat the percentage reduction in cumulative emis-
sions (at some future point in time) as the average emissions reduction. In an economy
where output and emissions tend to increase with time, this latter approach tends to assign
more weight to future emissions reductions than does the approach we have taken.
The annualized excess cost is equal to EV * (r + g)/(1 + r), where EV is the excess cost of
the policy change (as measured by the equivalent variation), r is the long-run or steady-
state, after-tax interest rate, and g is the long-run growth rate of the economy. The values














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ponder whether the remaining GNP costs might be offset by the reduc-
tions in other pollutants.
The benefit-cost numbers are limited in another sense. The true bene-
fits from reductions of CO2 (or other pollutants) are the result of complex
links from benefits to concentrations to ultimate health and welfare im-
pacts. Given this complexity, it is likely that the benefits per unit of
emission reduction for each pollutant will vary geographically and tem-
porally. We disregard these important complications and insteadas-
sume, in the case of CO2. fixed ratios of benefits per unit of emission
reduction. Hopefully, despite this limitation, the figures in Table 11are
still illuminating.
First steps toward assessing CO2-related benefitswere taken by
Nordhaus (1991), who postulated marginal environmental benefits from
CO2 emissions reduction as ranging from approximately $1.80 to $66per
ton. Row 4 of the table shows the annualized benefits from the CO2
reductions under two cases for each policy.47 The "low CO2 damages"
scenario imputes the $1.80 / ton value; the "high CO2 damages"case
imputes the $66.00 I ton value.48
The results in the table indicate that the residual GNP losses
annualized excess costs minus annualized CO2-related benefitsare
highly sensitive to assumptions about the CO2 damages. In thecase with
high CO2 damages, the CO2-related environmental benefits froma Btu
tax offset over 75 percent of the excess cost; in the case with low CO2
damages, about 3 percent of the excess cost is offset. The residual GNP
losses are smaller for the gasoline tax than for the Btu tax; thereverse is
true in the high CO2 damage scenario. This reflects the significant differ-
ences in the induced CO2 reductions of the two policies.49
We annualize the environmental benefits in the same way we annualize excess costs.
The annualized benefit equal to EB * (r - g) 1(1 + r), where EB is the present value of the
environmental benefits, r is the long-run, real after-tax interest rate, and g is the long-run,
real growth rate.
These figures are based on assessments of the potential global-warming-related dam-
ages from CO2. Because they do not take into account direct health effects of CO2. they
may understate overall benefits from CO2 reductions. On the other hand, it should be
noted that the Nordhaus estimates concern worldwide damages from CO2 emissions (or
worldwide benefits from CO2 emissions reductions). Benefits to the United States from
CO2 reductions would be only a fraction of the worldwide benefits.
It may seem surprising that when CO2 damages of $66 are assumed, the Btu tax still fails
to create positive net benefits (or a negative residual GNP loss). Basic Pigovian tax princi-
ples indicate that, so long as an environmental tax rate is below (or not far above) the value
of marginal environmental damages, then the tax is efficiency-improving. Under the Btu
tax, the implied rate of tax per ton of carbon is $12.80 on coal, $17.90 on natural gas, and
$32.50 on crude oil. The fact that these rates are less than the assumed marginal damages146Goulder
Table 11 does not answer the question whether either of the energy
taxes is efficiency-improving overall. Answering this questionrequires
more information about the environmentalbenefits associated with re-
ductions in the other pollutants (as well as reduced uncertainty about
CO2-related benefits). Perhaps economics and environmental science
will be able to provide this information some day.
5. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has employed a dynamic simulation model of the United
States to assess "traditional" (nonenvironmental) efficiency consequences
and environmental effects of two U.S. energy tax policies: a tax on fossil
and synthetic fuels based on Btu (or energy) content and a tax on con-
sumer purchases of gasoline. The model uniquelycombines attention to
details of the U.S. tax system with a consolidated treatment of U.S. energy
use and pollution emissions.
On traditional efficiency grounds, each of the energy taxes emerges as
more costly to the economy than equal-revenueincreases in personal or
corporate income taxes: the time profiles of GNP and consumption are
significantly lower under the energy taxes than under the alternatives.
Likewise, the welfare costs of the energy taxes are more than twice as
large (Table 4) as the costs of equal-revenue increments to personal or
corporate income taxes. This result that energy taxes involvehigher
gross costs is sustained over a fairly wide rangeof values for key behav-
ioral parameters.
An important structural difference between the Btu tax and the
consumer-level gasoline tax is that the former applies to a gross output
and the latter to a particular, final-consumption good. This difference
underlies the contrasting investment and consumption profiles of the
two energy tax options.
We perform a number of simulation experiments designed to identify
which features of these taxes account for their "excess costs"the
nonenvironmental welfare cost over and above that of an equal-revenue
increase in the personal income tax. For both energy taxes, the relative
narrowness of the tax base accounts for most of the excess cost.For the
from carbon emissions suggests that the Stu tax should be efficiency-improving. The
positive residual GNP loss thus seems to defy the Pigovian prediction.
The Pigovian prediction fails because it does not account for pre-existing taxes. In particu-
lar, it neglects the ways that energy taxes compound the gross distortions that other taxes
generate in other markets. When other taxes are present, the welfare (and GNP) costsof
"small" environmental taxes can be quite large. The fact that tax rates are below the
marginal environmental damages does not assure a welfare improvement. This issue is
analyzed in detail in Bovenberg and Goulder (1993).Btu tax, the type of tax baseits focus on gross output (as opposed to net
output under the personal income tax)also contributes to a significant
share of the excess cost. For the consumer-level gasoline tax, the fact that
this tax applies to consumption rather than income has a mitigating
effect, serving to reduce the excess cost.
On the environmental side, we find that for each of the eight major air
pollutants considered, the energy taxes induce emissions reductions
that are at least nine times larger than the reductions under the income-
tax alternatives. The differences in emissions impacts reflect the close
connections between energy use and pollution generation. For the Btu
tax, the largest emissions reductions (in terms of percentage) are for CO2
and NOX compounds. For the gasoline tax, the emissions reductionsare
spread fairly evenly across six of the eight pollutants considered.
Overall, this study indicates that the Btu and gasoline taxes considered
are inferior to the alternatives on narrow efficiency grounds but superior
on environmental grounds. It remains an open question whether the
environmental attractions of these taxes are large enough to offset their
relatively high nonenvironmental costs. To settle this issue, analysts need
to be able to quantify more accurately the links from emission reductions
to environment-related improvements in human welfare. Further re-
search along these lines will help important environmental consider-
ations gain a firm footing within the general domain of tax-policy analysis.
APPENDIX 1: MODEL STRUCTURE5°
A.1 Production
A.1.1 Technology
General featuresTable Al indicates the nested production structure.
In each industry i, gross output X is produced using inputs of labor L,
capital K, an energy composite E and a materials composite M1. The
production function has the following form:
= f[g1(L,K, - 4(I I K)I. (A-l)
The functions f, g11, and g21 are CES. Hence the function fcan be written
as:
f(g1, g2)=y1[a1g + (1 -)gj]1/Pt, (A-2)
Energy Taxes147
50 A more comprehensive description of the structure of the model is in Goulder (1992b).148Goulder
TABLE A-i.
Nested Production Structure.




M = M(M1,..., M7)
E1= E1(ED, EF)a
M. M(MD, MF)"
Note: All functions are CES in form except for
c!(IIK), which is quadratic in I/K.
5
bil.....7
where the industry subscript has been suppressed and where y, a1, and
P1 are parameters.The parameter p is related to o, the elasticity of substi-
tution between g1 and g2: p = (o- - 1)/u. Analogous expressions applyfor
the functions g1 and g2.
The second term in equation (1) represents the loss of output associ-
ated with installing new capital (or dismantling existing capital). Per-unit
adjustment costs, 4, are given by
(/2) (I/K - 6)2
1(IIK)
I/K
where I represents gross investment (purchases of new capital goods)
andand 6 are parameters. The parameter 6 denotes the rate of eco-
nomic depreciation of the capital stock.
The energy composite (E1) in equation (1) is a CES function of the
specific energy products of the different energy industries,
(A-3)
where = 1. The subscripts to E in equations (4a)and (4b) corre-
spond o energy industries as follows:





2 Oil and gas extraction and synthetic fuels
3 Petroleum refining
4 Electricity
5 Processed natural gas
Oil and gas and synthetic fuels combine as one input in the energy
composite, reflecting the fact that these fuels are treated as perfect substi-
tutes in production.51
Similarly, the materials compositeI) in equation (1) is a CES func-
tion of the specific materials products of the seven nonenergy industries:





where = 1. The subscripts to M in equations (5a) and (5b) corre-
spond !to materials (nonenergy) industries as follows:
Subscript Materials industry
1 Agriculture and mining (except coal mining)
2 Construction
3 Metals and machinery
4 Motor vehicles
5 Miscellaneous manufacturing
6 Services (except housing services)
7 Housing services
The elements E(j = 1,..., 5) and M1(j = 1,...,7) in the E and AI
functions are themselves CES composites of domestically produced and
foreign made inputs:
=YEJ[aEIED+ (1 - aEi)EF)].j =1,...,5(A-6)
M1 = YMI[aMiMDpJ + (1 - aMi)MFfs]Jj =1,.., 7, (A-7)





where ED1 and EF denote domestic and foreign energy inputs of type j,
and MD1 and MF denote domestic and foreign materials inputs of type].
Endogeneity of y in the oil and gas production functionIn industries other
than oil and gas, the element Yf in the production function is parametric.
In the oil and gas industry, Yf is a decreasing function of cumulative oil
and gas extraction,
=[i-(Z/Z)'2], (A-8)
whereand 2 are parameters, Z represents cumulative extraction as of
the beginning of period t, andis the original estimated total stock of
recoverable reserves of oil and gas (as estimated from the benchmark
year). The following equation of motion specifies the evolution of Z:
zt+= z + x. (A-9)
Equation (8) implies that the production function for oil and gas shifts
downward as cumulative oil and gas extraction increases. This addresses
the fact that as reserves are depleted, remaining reserves become more
difficult to extract and require more inputs per unit of extraction.
A.1.2 Behavior of FirmsIn each industry, managers of firms are as-
sumed to serve stockholders in aiming to maximize the value of the firm.
The objective of firm-value maximization determines firms' choices of
input quantities and investment levels in each period of time.
The value of the firm can be expressed in terms of dividends and new
share issues, which in turn depend on profits in each period. The firm's
profits during a given period are given by
IT = (1 - ;) [pX - w(1 + TL)L - EMCOST -iDEBT - TPROP] +
;(DEPL + DEPR), (A-b)
where r, is the tax rate on profits, p is the output price net of output taxes,
w is the wage rate net of indirect labor taxes, TLis rate of the indirect tax on
labor, EMCOST is the cost to the firm of energy and materials inputs, i is
the gross-of-tax interest rate paid by the firm, DEBT is the firm's current
debt, TPROP is property tax payments, DEPL is the current gross deple-
tion allowance, and DEPR is the current gross depreciation allowance.
TPROP equals T PK,S_1KS, whereis the property tax rate, PK is the purchase
price of a unit of new capital, and s is the time period. Current depletion
allowances, DEPL, are a constant fraction /3 of the value of current extrac-tion: DEPL=f3pX. Current depreciation allowances, DEPR, can be ex-
pressed as 6TKT, where KT is the depreciable capital stock basis and 5T is the
depreciation rate applied for tax purposes.52
In equation (10), EMCOST is given by
5
EMCOST= (1 + TEI)(PED JEDJ + PEF,IE)
j=1
7
+(i + TflI)(PMD/VIDI + PMF,IMFI), (A-il)
1='
where the subscripts for energy and materials correspond to industries
as indicated above; and where T and 'TM denote the tax rates applying to
the firm's use of intermediate inputs, andPED,1 and PEF,j (PMD,1 and PMF,1) are
the pretax prices of domestic and foreign energy (materials) inputs of
typej.53
The following accounting or cash-flow identity links the firm'ssources
and uses of revenues:
IT + BN + VN=DIV + IEXP. (A-12)
The left-hand side is the firm's source of revenues: profits,new debt
issue (BN), and new share issues (VN). The uses ofrevenues on the
right-hand side are investment expenditure (IEXP) and dividendpay-
ments (Dlv). Negative share issues are equivalent to share repurchases,
and represent a use rather than source of revenue.
Firms pay dividends equal to a constant fraction a of profits net of
economic depreciation, and maintain debt equal to a constant fraction b
of the value of the existing capital stock. Thus,
DIVS=a [+(PK,S - PK,s_1)I<S-ÔPK,SK$] (A-13)
52 For convenience, we assume that the accelerated depreciation schedulecan be approxi-
mated by a schedule involving constant exponential tax depreciation.
To simplify the exposition, we have not included in equations (A-b) and (A-li) sub-
scripts identifying the given industry for which profits or input costs are calculated. It may
be noted that the intermediate good taxes, T1 and TMI, may differ across industries usinga
particular good as well as across intermediate goods.
In equation (A-li), for]=2 the expression PEJ (1 + r1) E1 is short-hand forp,g (1 + ;) E,5 +
p,1 (1 + ;) E,1, where"og"refers to oil and gas and"sf"refers to synfuels. Since oil and gas
and synfuels are perfect substitutes, it is always the case that gross-of-tax costs of these fuels
to the firm are the same; that is, p,5 (1 +=p,1(l +However, when the net-of-
tax pricesuand p,1 will differ.
Energy Taxes151152Goulder
BN5DEBT51 - DEBTS = b(pK,SKS+l PK,s_1I<s) (A-14)
Investment expenditure is expressed by
IEXP5 = (1 - TK)PK S1S, (A-15)
where TK is the investment tax-credit rate. Of the elements in equation
(12), new share issues VN are the residual, making up the difference
between ir + BN and DIV + IEXP.M
Arbitrage possibilities compel the firm to offer its stockholders a rate of
return comparable to the rate of interest on alternative assets.55
(1Te) DIV9 + (1 - T)(V5+i - V5 - VN) = (1 - Tb) is V5(A-16)
The parameters ;, ;, and Tb are the personal tax rates on dividend
income (equity), capital gains, and interest income (bonds), respectively.
The return to stockholders consists of the current after-tax dividend plus
the after-tax capital gain (accrued or realized) on the equity value (V) of
the firm net of the value of new share issues. This return must be compa-
rable to the after-tax return from an investment of the same value at the
market rate of interest i.
The firm's decision problem is completed by the equation of motion
for the capital stock,
I<= (1 - 6)K5 + I. (A-17)
Capital is augmented by net investment. Cumulative extraction is aug-
mented by the level of current output (or extraction). In the oil and gas
industry, the equation of motion (9) also applies.
A.2 Household Behavior
Consumption, labor supply, and saving result from the decisions of an
infinitely lived representative household maximizing its intertemporal
utility with perfect foresight. The nested structure of the household's
utility function is indicated in Table A2. In year t the household chooses




For a discussion of alternative specifications, see Poterba and Summers (1985).
This abstracts from uncertainty and, therefore, risk. It is possible to modify the arbitrage











U5 intertemporal utility evaluated from period
=full consumption in period s
Cs=overall goods consumption in period
=leisure in period
C55=consumption of composite consumer good i in periods
CD5 =consumption of domestically produced consumer good i in period
CF55 =consumption of foreign produced consumer good i in period
where co is the subjective rate of time preference andcr is the in-
tertemporal elasticity of substitution in full consumption. C isa CES






v is the elasticity of substitution between goods and leisure;ais an
intensity parameter for leisure.
The variablein (20) is a Cobb-Douglas aggregate of seventeencom-
posite consumer goods:
= fJ , (A-20)
where the a(i=1,..., 17) are parameters. The seventeen types of
consumer goods identified in the model are shown in Table 2 of the main
text.
Consumer goods are produced domestically and abroad. Eachcompos-
ite consumer good ', i=1,..., 17, is a CES aggregate of a domestic
and foreign consumer good of a given type,
=Y4aCDPC+(1 -a)CFPe]1c. (A-21)
In the above equation, CD and CF denote the household's consumption
of domestically produced and foreign-madeconsumer good of a given154Goulder
type at a given point in time. For simplicity, we haveomitted subscripts
designating the type of consumer good and the time period.
The household maximizes utility subject to the intertemporalbudget
constraint given by the following condition governing the change in
financial wealth WK:
- WK = + YL + GT - (A-22)
In the above equation, P is the average after-tax return on the house-
hold's portfolio of financial capital, YL is after-tax labor income, GT is
transfer income, and p is the price index representing the cost to the
household of a unit of the consumption composite, C.
A.3 Government Behavior
A single government sector approximates government activities atall
levelsfederal, state, and local. The main activities of the government
sector are purchasing goods and services (both nondurableand dura-
ble), transferring incomes, and raising revenue through taxes or bond
issue.
A.3.1 Components of Government Expenditure Governmentexpendi-
ture G divides into nominal purchases of nondurablegoods and services
(GP), nominal government investment (GI), and nominal transfers(GT):
G, = GP + GI + GT (A-23)
In the reference case, the paths of real GP, GI, and GT all arespecified
as growing at the steady-state, realgrowth rate g. In simulating policy
changes we fix the paths of GP, GI, and GT so that the pathsof real
government purchases, investments, and transfers are the same asin
corresponding years of the reference case. Thus, the expenditure sideof
the government ledger is largely kept unchanged across simulations.
This procedure is expressed by
GP' I p= GP / p (A-24a)
GI I = GIPi,t (A-24b)
GT I PT,t = GT I PT,t (A-24c)
The superscripts P and R denote policy-change and reference-case mag-
nitudes, and Pcp' PGI' and PGT are price indices for GP, GI, and GT. TheEnergy Taxes155
price index for government investmentPGI is the purchase price of the
representative capital good. The price index for transfers,PGTI is the
consumer price index. The index for government purchasesPGP is de-
fined in equation (A-26).
A.3.2 Allocation of Government Purchases GP divides into purchases
of particular outputs of the thirteen domestic industries accordingto
fixed expenditure shares:
aGGP = GPXp1,i = 1,..., 13. (A-25)
GPX1 and p are the quantity demanded and price of output from indus-
try i, and aGI is the corresponding expenditure share. The ideal price

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Parameters of Stock Effect Function in Oil and Gas Industry.
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